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HUSTED V. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH 
INSTITUTE: HOW CAN STATES 
MAINTAIN THEIR VOTER ROLLS? 
CHRIS SMITH* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under our federal system of government, individual states 
designate how elections for federal office are carried out, including 
how voters register and stay registered, subject to certain guidelines 
imposed by the federal government. Oftentimes, broad policy goals of 
federal statutes can conflict, leaving states to determine what is an 
acceptable compromise. In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute,1 the 
Supreme Court has the opportunity to provide guidance to the states 
on what is an acceptable policy choice. By upholding Ohio’s 
Supplemental Process, the Supreme Court can delineate the line 
between maintaining an accurate voter roll and not removing people 
solely for failing to vote. This commentary argues that this would be 
the proper outcome for three reasons.  First, the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) bans states from using nonvoting 
as the cause of removal, which the Ohio law does not do.2 Second, the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”) clarifies that states are 
allowed to send out notices to voters to confirm where they live and 
can remove them if they do not respond or vote.3 Third and finally, the 
NVRA only requires reasonable efforts on the part of states, implying 
that individual state choices should be given deference by the courts. 
I. FACTS 
The state of Ohio uses two distinct methods for determining when 
a potential voter is ineligible due to having moved.4 In the first 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2019. 
 1.  Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., No. 16-980 (U.S. May 30, 2017). 
 2.  National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (2012). 
 3.  Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (2012). 
 4.  See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN § 3503.21 (2016). 
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method, which is not challenged in this case, the Ohio Secretary of 
State compares the state voter lists to the National Change of Address 
(“NCOA”) database.5 If a registered voter is listed as having moved, a 
confirmation notice is sent to the old address.6 Voters are then 
removed from the voter rolls if they do not respond to the notice and 
do not vote within the next four year period that contains two federal 
general elections.7 
The second method, called the “Supplemental Process”, follows the 
same process as the first method, but the triggering event is different.8 
Under the Supplemental Process, each county’s board of electors 
compiles a list of registered voters who have not engaged in voter 
activities over the past two years.9 Once on the list, a voter is sent a 
confirmation similar to the one sent in the first method.10 They are 
then removed from the rolls if they do not respond to the notice or 
vote within the next four years.11 
During the 2016 federal election, roughly 7,515 people who 
showed up to vote would have been unable to cast their ballots had 
the law been allowed to go into place.12 With the injunction granted, 
all 7,515 individuals were allowed to cast a provisional ballot.13 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The seemingly conflicting federal policies about when and how to 
ensure accurate voter rolls, which appear in both the NVRA and 
HAVA, are at issue in Husted.14 
A. National Voter Registration Act 
Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act in 1993 for 
two specific purposes: to (1) increase the number of eligible citizens 
who register and participate in elections and (2) protect the integrity 
of the voting process by ensuring that accurate voter lists are 
 
 5.  See A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699, 702 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017). 
 6.  Id. at 703. 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Brief for Petitioner at 13–14, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., No. 16-980 (2017) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 13.  Id. at 14. 
 14.  See id. at 2.  
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maintained.15 Congress noted that some states used unfair registration 
and list maintenance practices that had the effect of keeping voters 
away from the polls, which deprived these voters of their fundamental 
right to vote.16 The NVRA sought to end these practices while 
ensuring that ineligible voters were kept off voter rolls.17 
As one of many methods18 to achieve its first goal of increasing 
the number of registered voters, the NVRA sought to keep registered 
voters on the voter rolls until they actually became ineligible.19 
Because not being registered to vote was one of the primary reasons 
given for not voting,20 Congress sought to increase the number of 
voters registered by making it more difficult to remove eligible 
voters.21 The NVRA lists five specific reasons for removal from the 
voter rolls including: a voter’s request for removal,22 criminal 
conviction,23 mental incapacitation,24 death,25 or change of residence.26 
Prior to NVRA’s enactment, many states had used nonvoting or voter 
inactivity as a reason to remove voters from the rolls.27 The NVRA 
specifically banned this practice in the Failure-to-Vote Clause.28 
To achieve its second goal of maintaining accurate and current 
voter lists, the NVRA imposed new duties on the states. The primary 
duty at issue here required states to make a “reasonable effort to 
remove the names of ineligible voters” from the voter rolls if they 
died or moved out of the district.29 These programs were subject to 
additional limitations. They could not violate the Voting Rights Act or 
remove a registered voter “by reason of the person’s failure to vote.”30 
 
 15.  See 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1)–(4). 
 16.  § 20501(a)(3). 
 17.  § 20501(b)(1)–(4). 
 18.  See, e.g., §§ 20504–20506 (requiring states to allow registration through the 
Department of Motor Vehicles, through mail, and through public offices); § 20507(a)(1) 
(requiring states to leave registration open until at least 30 days before an election). 
 19.  See § 20507(a)(3)–(4) (limiting the situations in which the states can remove registered 
voters from the voter lists). 
 20.  See H.R. REP. NO. 103-9, at 3. 
 21.  See § 20507(a)(3)–(4). 
 22.  § 20507(a)(3)(A). 
 23.  § 20507(a)(3)(B). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  § 20507(a)(4)(A). 
 26.  § 20507(a)(4)(B). 
 27.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 4. 
 28.  § 20507(b)(2). 
 29.  § 20507(a)(4). 
 30.  § 20507(b)(1)–(2). 
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To provide a guideline for how states could meet this duty, 
Congress laid out a two-step process for attempting to confirm that a 
person had moved to a new location if the Postal Service had not 
already documented the move.31 The first step is to send a 
confirmation letter to the address, requesting that the voter fill out a 
form to confirm that they still lived at that address.32 If the person did 
not return the completed form, he or she could be removed from the 
voter list if he or she did not vote or attempt to vote in any election 
before the next two general federal elections are held.33 The NVRA 
did not explicitly prohibit or allow refraining from voting to serve as a 
trigger for the confirmation notices.34 This omission had led to 
confusion over what states are allowed to do to reach the safe harbor 
of the two-step confirmation process outlined by the NVRA.35 
B. Help America Vote Act 
Partially in response to this confusion, Congress passed the Help 
America Vote Act in 2002.36 HAVA changed the NVRA in two main 
ways: by clarifying when a state election official could remove 
someone from the voter list because they had moved,37 and adding the 
duty to maintain an accurate and current statewide voter list.38 
The clarification was made by adding the phrase “except that 
nothing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State from 
using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove 
an individual from the official list . . . if the individual” did not respond 
to the confirmation notice or vote in the next two general federal 
elections to the NVRA’s Failure-to-Vote Clause.39 This made clear 
that it was acceptable to use the person’s lack of voting after the 
confirmation was sent to remove that person from the voter list, so 
long as the process was not discriminatory in nature.40 
 
 31.  § 20507(d)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 32.  § 20507(d)(1)(B)(i). 
 33.  § 20507(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 34.  See § 20507. 
 35.  Compare Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 14, with Brief for Respondent at 21, 
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., No. 16-980 (2017) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 36.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 8–9. 
 37.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 9; Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 9. 
 38.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 9–10; Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 10. 
 39.  § 20507(b)(2). 
 40.  See id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 37. 
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The second change required states to keep a statewide list of all 
registered voters and make reasonable efforts to maintain it.41 An 
added duty under HAVA made removal of voters who did not 
respond to confirmation notices or vote in the next two general 
federal elections mandatory.42 The NVRA’s exception to this rule, that 
otherwise eligible voters could not be removed for not voting, was 
kept in place. However, HAVA added a qualifier to the exception by 
stating that “no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a 
failure to vote” (emphasis in Brief for Petitioner, but not in statute).43 
Still, the change made clear that it was not overruling or substantially 
altering the NVRA’s limitations on what processes where allowable.44 
III. HOLDING 
The Sixth Circuit held Ohio’s Supplemental Process violated the 
Failure-To-Vote Clause45 because the notices were triggered by the 
would-be voter’s failure to vote.46 Since Ohio’s Supplemental Process 
only begins when a registered voter does not vote, the Sixth Circuit 
held that not voting was the cause of removal.47 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
The parties in Husted disagree on two basic points related to the 
NVRA and HAVA. The first basic question is whether Ohio’s 
Supplemental Process violates Section 8 of the NVRA. The next 
question is whether or how the HAVA clarification changed what 
constitutes an allowable scheme under the regulation. 
A. Does Ohio’s Supplemental Process, which relies on voter inactivity 
to trigger the sending of confirmation notices, violate Section 8 of 
the NVRA? 
Petitioner Jon Husted, Ohio’s Secretary of State, argues that 
Ohio’s Supplemental Process is allowed under the NVRA for three 
primary reasons.48 First, Petitioner argues that the section requires 
 
 41.  Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a) (2012). 
 42.  § 21083(a)(4)(A). 
 43.  Id.; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
 44.  § 21083(a)(4)(A). 
 45.  § 20507(b)(2). 
 46.  A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699, 711–12 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017). 
 47.  Id. at 15–16. 
 48.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 13. 
SMITH FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/22/2018  10:57 AM 
124 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13 
voter inactivity to be the proximate cause of the purge for Ohio’s 
process to violate the NVRA and that the requirement of a failure to 
respond to notice by the registered voter severs that required causal 
connection.49 The relevant subsection of the statute explains how a 
state’s process “shall not result in the removal of . . . any person from 
the official list of voters registered to vote . . . by reason of the 
person’s failure to vote.”50 This language, particularly the “by reason 
of,” has been interpreted by other courts to require proximate cause.51 
According to Petitioner, if failing to vote was not the proximate cause 
of the removal, then the process has not violated the NVRA.52 
Petitioner argues that the lack of a response to the confirmation 
notice is the proximate cause of the removal.53 The voter is assumed 
to have moved because they did not respond to the letter, not simply 
because they have not voted.54 Because this extra step is present, 
Petitioner argues that failure to vote is not the proximate cause and 
thus the process is allowable under the NVRA.55 
Second, Petitioner argues that had Congress meant to ban this 
trigger for sending out confirmation letters, it would have made it far 
more explicit.56 Petitioner notes how common this type of process was 
when the NVRA passed.57 To ban it would have been seen as a large 
departure from the status quo.58 Courts generally should not assume 
that Congress subtly makes massive changes to current processes.59 
Rather, Congress is assumed to only make large changes when it does 
so explicitly. The NVRA explicitly bans the failure to vote as the sole 
cause of removal, but it does not ban failure to vote as a triggering 
mechanism.60 Petitioner argues that the NVRA should be read in a 
way that allows for processes like Ohio’s Supplemental Process to be 
maintained.61 
 
 49.  Id. at 19. 
 50.  § 20507(d)(2).  
 51.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 22 (citing Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 
U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). 
 52.  Id. at 19. 
 53.  Id. at 24. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 24–25. 
 56.  Id. at 27. 
 57.  See id. at 4 (noting states that used nonvoting as a trigger for removal). 
 58.  Id. at 27–28. 
 59.  Id. at 27 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006)).  
 60.  See id. at 27–29. 
 61.  See id. 
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Third, Petitioner argues that the language banning use of voter 
inactivity should only apply to the actual removal, not the trigger for 
sending confirmation notices.62 The statute says nothing about what 
can or can not trigger confirmation notices.63 Petitioner argues that 
reading this phrase into the statute changes its meaning in an 
unacceptable way.64 The statute must instead be read as a whole, with 
different requirements for its different parts.65 This allows the use of 
voter inactivity to trigger the sending of confirmation notices, while it 
would clearly be impermissible to use it as the sole reason for 
removing voters.66 
Respondent A. Philip Randolph Institute, in contrast, first argues 
that not responding to a confirmation notice is not an acceptable 
reason for removal under the NVRA.67 Respondent notes that there 
are very clear examples of acceptable reasons for removal listed in the 
statute, and that being unresponsive is not one of them.68 Thus, even if 
not responding was the proximate cause, that interpretation of the 
statute would still lead to a violation of the NVRA.69 
Second, Respondent argues that the use of proximate cause at all 
in the interpretation of this statute is inappropriate.70 Rather, the 
word “result” should be given its plain meaning.71 This would lead to a 
much broader scope of what would be inappropriate under the statute 
than Petitioner’s view.72 If failure to vote were a trigger for the notices, 
it would clearly have an effect on the outcome, if for no other reason 
than the process of removal would never have started without it.73 
Third, Respondent argues that even though use of not voting to 
confirm a move is allowable under the statute, its use before notice 
has been sent out is clearly not allowed.74 The delineation between the 
subparts of the statute is necessary to prevent part of it from being 
 
 62.  See id. at 31–32. 
 63.  See 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2012). 
 64.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 30–31. 
 65.  Id. at 31. 
 66.  See id. at 34–35 (comparing the language used in different sections of the statute). 
 67.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 25. 
 68.  Id. at 25–26. 
 69.  Id. at 26. 
 70.  Id. at 31. 
 71.  See id. at 28. 
 72.  See id. at 29–30. 
 73.  See id.  
 74.  See id. at 38–39. 
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rendered mere surplusage.75 If there is no distinction between the 
confirmation process requirements and the normal removal 
requirements, then the subsection setting out the specific 
requirements of confirmation becomes unnecessary.76 Thus, Ohio’s 
Supplemental Process cannot be deemed to have met the statutory 
requirements.77 
B. Did the HAVA amendments alter the legality of Ohio’s 
Supplemental Process? 
Petitioner argues first that even if the language of the NVRA was 
ambiguous as to whether Ohio’s Supplemental Process was allowed, 
HAVA’s clarification clearly establishes it as an allowable process.78 
The legislative history of the amendment clarifies that it was designed 
to permit schemes like the one utilized by Ohio.79 Prior to its 
enactment, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) had targeted other 
states with similar schemes.80 Yet following the enactment of HAVA, 
the DOJ entered into an agreement with Philadelphia that mandated 
it use a scheme similar to the one used by Ohio.81 
Additionally, Petitioner argues that the wording of the HAVA 
amendment makes it clear that it was designed to limit when the 
prohibition of removal for nonvoting applied.82 The first part was in 
the Failure to Vote Clause, which added, “except that nothing in this 
paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State from using the 
procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an 
individual” whom did not respond to notice or vote in over the next 
four-year period with two general federal elections.83 This would 
indicate that HAVA hemmed in when the prohibition would apply.84 
The second major change caused by HAVA required the states to 
maintain statewide voter lists.85 When maintaining these lists, states 
were banned from using nonvoting as the “sole[] . . . reason” for 
 
 75.  See id. at 39–40. 
 76.  See id. 
 77.  Id. at 40. 
 78.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 35. 
 79.  See id. at 36–37. 
 80.  See id. at 36. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See id. at 37. 
 83.  52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2) (2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 36. 
 84.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 36–37. 
 85.  See id. at 38–39. 
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removing a voter from the list.86 Since Ohio was maintaining its voter 
list and used a lack of response to a confirmation notice as a reason, 
Ohio’s Supplemental Process should be allowed to stand.87 
Conversely, Respondent argues that HAVA merely clarified 
NVRA’s prohibition on the use of nonvoting as a reason for 
removal.88 The amendment’s main purpose was to clear up when there 
was an exception to the broad prohibition against the use of 
nonvoting.89 Since it is an exception to the general rule and purpose of 
the statute, it should be limited in its scope.90 Therefore, the clarified 
statute must be read so that removal for nonvoting is only allowed in 
the narrow example of not responding to confirmation notices.91 The 
use of nonvoting to send out confirmation notices would still be 
impermissible under the HAVA amendments.92 
Second, Respondent argues that the HAVA clarification in 
§ 21083(a)(4)(A) confirms that Ohio’s Supplemental Process violates 
the law.93 The main contention is with the phrase “except that no 
registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote[]” in 
the statute (emphasis added).94 If the two conditions of not 
responding and not voting were enough to always result in removal, 
this phrase would have no purpose, as no voter would be removed 
solely for nonvoting.95 For the phrase to have any practical effect and 
not be mere surplusage, there must be an example of something that 
would fall under the exception.96 Therefore, this phrase should be read 
in a way that gives it meaning, so using a nonresponse to a 
confirmation notice cannot always be enough to prevent nonvoting 
from being the sole cause.97 Ohio’s Supplemental Process is an 
example of removal for nonvoting and it should not be allowed to 
stand.98 
 
 86.  Id. at 39 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(A) (2012) (“except that no registrant may be 
removed solely by reason of a failure to vote”)). 
 87.  Id. at 45. 
 88.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 44. 
 89.  Id. at 44–45. 
 90.  See id. at 45. 
 91.  See id. at 45–46. 
 92.  See id. at 46. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 46–47(citing 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(A) (2012)). 
 95.  See id. 
 96.  Id. at 47. 
 97.  See id. (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 185 (2011)). 
 98.  See id. at 48–49. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should uphold Ohio’s Supplemental Process 
as a valid procedure under the NVRA and HAVA amendments. The 
statutory language, both prior to and after the HAVA amendments, 
permits such a process. A Supreme Court decision upholding the law 
as a valid exercise of state power would provide a much-needed 
guideline for other states seeking to thread the needle between 
keeping voters eligible and maintaining accurate voter lists.99 
Courts normally read laws as a whole so that different clauses and 
parts do not conflict with each other.100 This canon of construction 
should be applied to the NVRA. The ban on the use of nonvoting 
should not be read to conflict with the proscribed two-step process if a 
reconciliation between the two phrases is possible.101 That is certainly 
the case with the NVRA. The clarification of the Failure-to-Vote 
clause makes it clear that it was not meant to conflict with the 
confirmation process. By reading a conflict into the statute, the Sixth 
Circuit left the mandate of maintaining accurate voter lists severely 
weakened, as there would be no specific event, absent self-reporting 
of a move, that could be sure to allow the process to begin.102 
An alternative reading of the statute that avoids conflict is 
available to the Court. While the Court need not import causation 
analysis from tort law into the context of voting rights and voter list 
maintenance as Petitioner suggests,103 a plain reading of when the 
confirmation process is allowed under the HAVA amendments 
provides a more palatable alternative. The word “solely” is crucial to 
the statute.104 If something is caused by more than one factor, it is not 
solely caused by either one.105 Under Ohio’s Supplemental Process, a 
voter can never vote and still retain eligibility. All the voter would 
have to do is respond to the confirmation notice when it is sent out, 
and the voter would remain on the voter list. Reading the statute as a 
 
 99.  Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia utilize a 
process similar to Ohio’s process. Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 15–16. 
 100.  See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722–23 (2017) 
(presuming that identical words used in different parts of the same statute carry the same 
meaning). 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  See A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699, 711–12 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017). 
 103.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 19. 
 104.  52 U.S.C. §§ 21083(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
 105.  Solely, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed. 2018) (“to the exclusion of all else”). 
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whole allows states to maintain accurate voter rolls while still 
prohibiting removal for non-voting. Such a reading would also place 
Ohio’s Supplemental Process clearly within the acceptable limits. 
There is also no reason to treat the potential use of non-voting to 
trigger the confirmation notices as an exception, as Respondent 
suggests.106 If the Court were to treat this allowance as an exception to 
the general rule, it would be appropriate to limit its scope.107 Such a 
limitation would allow for its use once the confirmation process has 
started, but would prohibit it from being a trigger. However, reading 
the language to create an exception is unnecessary when interpreting 
the NVRA. The law is silent about what can be used as a triggering 
event, except for the voter’s appearance in the NCOA database.108 
The statute can be read as a whole to allow all the parts to 
complement each other by interpreting it as banning failure to vote as 
the sole cause for removal. Thus, there would be no need to read the 
mandate of § 21083(a)(4)(A) as an exception to this rule since it 
clearly does not fall under the prohibition. 
From a more practical perspective, prior to a decision in this case, 
there is an open question about what is an acceptable trigger to send 
confirmation notices to voters. Clearly, if the voter is listed in the 
NCOA database, a confirmation notice can be sent to the address to 
start the removal process.109 However, there are studies to suggest that 
a significant number of people do not go through the trouble of 
registering their moves to different addresses.110 There is no clear, 
practical way for states to trigger the process for removing these 
ineligible voters from the list. 
One potential legislative alternative to Ohio’s Supplemental 
Process would be to send every registered voter a confirmation notice 
every two years, regardless of whether they have voted in the past two 
years. If they do not return the confirmation notice, they would be 
subject to the same removal process imposed by Ohio’s current law. 
This would not protect people from inaccurate removal. No effort 
would be made to determine if people had moved before sending out 
the notices. If a person were to be removed under Ohio’s current 
 
 106.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 35, at 39–40. 
 107.  See Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (“[The Court] usually read[s] the 
exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.”). 
 108.  52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(1)(2012). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 46. 
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process, he or she would still be removed under this alternative. The 
person would still receive the notice, would still not respond, and 
would still not vote for the next four years. The only difference would 
be that under the mass confirmation process, more potentially eligible 
voters would be removed since a larger pool of people would be at 
risk. Yet, under the logic of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, this result 
would be acceptable under the law, since the trigger for sending out 
confirmation notices was in no way related to not-voting.111 
The states are “laboratories for experimentation to devise various 
solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”112 That reasoning 
should rule the day in this case. According to census statistics, 16.9 
million Americans move to a new county annually.113 Yet, a significant 
amount of these Americans do not report their change of address.114 
The question of how to remove these unreported voters in accordance 
with the NVRA is still an open question. By allowing Ohio’s program 
to stand, the Court would go a long way towards clearing up this issue. 
States seeking to be in compliance with the dual mandates of the 
NVRA would have the ability to do so by following Ohio’s lead. 
Whereas if this law is struck down, states would still be scrambling to 
bring their voter list maintenance standards within the requirements 
of the law. 
There is no question that voting rights and the sanctity of elections 
are hot-button topics.115 Americans have become more politically 
polarized since the NVRA and HAVA amendments were enacted.116 
It would not be a surprise for the Supreme Court to split 5-4 with a 
Republican-appointed majority writing the opinion of the Court. 
Though upholding Ohio’s Supplemental Process would seem to be a 
partisan decision, the federal law itself and the practical 
considerations of the effects of the opinion make this the correct 
 
 111.  See A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699, 711–12 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017). 
 112.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 113.  Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Americans Moving at Historically Low Rates, 
Census Bureau Reports (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2016/cb16-189.html. 
 114.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 46. 
 115.  See Matt Ford, Use It or Lose It?, THE ATLANTIC (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/supreme-court-ohio-voting/528573/; Ariane 
de Vogue, Supreme Court Will Consider Ohio Voter Purge Case, CNN (May 30, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/30/politics/ohio-supreme-court/index.html. 
 116.  Political Polarization, 1994-2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.people-
press.org/interactives/political-polarization-1994-2017/. 
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decision for the Court to make. The Court has made far more 
impactful and potentially political decisions in the realm of voting 
rights before.117 Therefore, it should not let the appearance of politics 
prevent the Court from coming to the correct legal decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has an opportunity to provide certainty for states 
looking for answers on how to resolve the paradox created by 
conflicting federal policies on voter list maintenance. By following the 
plain language of the statutes at issue, the Supreme Court can provide 
states with a blueprint for how to comply with these dueling 
mandates. Ohio has sought and succeeded in finding an equitable 
balance that is allowable under the NVRA and HAVA. Consequently, 
the Supreme Court should overturn the Sixth Circuit and find Ohio’s 




 117.  See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that the Voting 
Rights Act provision setting forth a coverage formula was unconstitutional); Crawford v. 
Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (holding that the state’s interests identified 
as justifications for an Indiana statute requiring government issued photo identification to vote 
were sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation imposed on voters). 
